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Abstract—Zero-shot learning (ZSL) has received extensive attention recently especially in areas of fine-grained object recognition,
retrieval, and image captioning. Due to the complete lack of training samples and high requirement of defense transferability, the ZSL
model learned is particularly vulnerable against adversarial attacks. Recent work also showed adversarially robust generalization
requires more data. This may significantly affect the robustness of ZSL. However, very few efforts have been devoted towards this
direction. In this paper, we take an initial attempt, and propose a generic formulation to provide a systematical solution (named ATZSL)
for learning a robust ZSL model. It is capable of achieving better generalization on various adversarial objects recognition while only
losing a negligible performance on clean images for unseen classes, by casting ZSL into a min-max optimization problem. To address
it, we design a defensive relation prediction network, which can bridge the seen and unseen class domains via attributes to generalize
prediction and defense strategy. Additionally, our framework can be extended to deal with the poisoned scenario of unseen class
attributes. An extensive group of experiments are then presented, demonstrating that ATZSL obtains remarkably more favorable
trade-off between model transferability and robustness, over currently available alternatives under various settings.
Index Terms—Zero-shot learning, robustness, optimization, defensive, unseen class
F
1 INTRODUCTION
IN many practical applications, we need the model tohave the ability to determine the class labels for the
data belonging to unseen classes. The following are some
popular application scenarios [1]:
- The number of target classes is large. Generally, human
beings can recognize at least 30,000 object classes [2].
However, collecting sufficient labeled instances for
such a large number of classes is challenging. Thus,
existing image datasets can only cover a small subset
of these classes.
- Target classes are rare. An example is fine-grained
object recognition. Suppose we want to recognize
flowers of different breeds [3]. It is hard and even
prohibitive to collect sufficient image instances for
each specific flower breed.
- Target classes change over time. An example is rec-
ognizing images of products belonging to a cer-
tain style and brand. As products of new styles
and new brands appear frequently, for some new
products, it is difficult to find corresponding labeled
instances [4].
- Annotating instances is expensive and time consuming.
For example, in the image captioning problem [5],
each image in the training data should have a corre-
sponding caption. This problem can be seen as a se-
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Fig. 1. The visual images and class prototypes provided for several
classes in benchmark dataset AWA2 [6].
quential classification problem. The number of object
classes covered by the existing image-text corpora
is limited, with many classes not being covered in
practice.
To solve this problem, Zero-Shot Learning (ZSL) [7],
[8], [9], [10], [11], [12], [13], [14] is proposed. The goal is
to recognize data belonging to the classes that have no
labeled samples. Since its inception, it has become a fast-
developing field in machine learning with a wide range
of applications in computer vision. Due to lack of labeled
samples in the unseen class domain, auxiliary information is
necessary for ZSL to transfer knowledge from the seen to the
unseen classes. As shown in Fig. 1, existing methods usually
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2provide each class with one class prototype derived from text
(e.g., attribute vector [15], [16], [17] or word vector [18], [19],
[20]). This is inspired by the way human beings recognize
the world. For example, with the knowledge that “a zebra
looks like a horse, and with stripes”, we can recognize a
zebra even without having seen one before, as long as we
know what a “horse” is and how “stripes” look like.
Despite achieving outstanding performance on general
recognition tasks, state-of-the-art classifiers remain highly
vulnerable to small, imperceptible, and adversarial pertur-
bations [21]. This vulnerability in the ZSL scenario is also
inevitable, where an unseen object is transformed by an
undetectable amount. It may be even easier to be attacked
for ZSL models compared with normal supervised learning
models, since [22] has proved that adversarially robust
generalization requires more data, while there does not exist
any training data for unseen classes in ZSL. In particu-
lar, while people mostly care about the transferability and
discriminability, the robustness of ZSL models is usually
ignored though it is also extremely important. We have em-
pirically proved the adversarial perturbations in zero-shot
recognition are more intricate to be addressed by existing
ZSL models. This comes from the fact that without labeled
samples in the unseen class domain, ZSL models need to
transfer knowledge not only from the seen to the unseen
classes, but also from the clean to the adversarial examples
with unknown adversaries. Consequently, it is difficult and
risky to apply such fragile ZSL models in practice, especially
in security-critical areas. For example, if we use a zero-shot
activity recognition model in self-driving cars, adversarial
examples of those unseen activities could allow an attacker
to cause the car to take unwanted actions.
Besides in the visual space, the adversarial examples in
the semantic space are also inevitable. This is because the
class prototypes of unseen classes, either human-defined
attributes or automatically extracted word vectors, are all
obtained independently from visual samples, and then eas-
ily been poisoned undetectably. However, these prototypes
play a key role in transferring knowledge from the seen to
the unseen classes, and thus even a small perturbation will
degrade the recognition performance. One example, when
the description is changed to “a zebra looks like a horse,
and without stripes”, we are not able to recognize a zebra
“without stripes”.
Motivated by the two key observations in the visual
and semantic spaces above, in this work, we focus on
developing a robust ZSL model. Different from previous
ZSL methods, we propose to train a novel ZSL model
adversarially. By injecting adversarial examples into our
model, it is able to achieve promising generalization on
unseen objects recognition under various image or attribute
attacks. And meanwhile, the recognition performance on
clean data has only non-obvious degradation by designing
a defensive relation prediction network. In particular, the
added overhead to generate and train adversarial examples
can be negligible. We emphasize our contributions in four
aspects:
- To the best of our knowledge, our work describes
the first algorithmic framework to jointly optimize
the two key goals: ZSL robustness against adversarial
attacks, and transferability to unseen classes.
- We develop ATZSL: an Adversarially Trained Zero-
Shot Learning model, to alleviate the instability issue
of ZSL caused by small, well sought perturbations of
both images and attributes.
- By casting ZSL into a constrained min-max optimiza-
tion form, our ATZSL transfers knowledge from the
clean to the adversarial examples, thus achieving
competitive trade-off between the performances in
clean and adversarial domains.
- The seen and unseen class domains are bridged by
a defensive relation prediction network in ATZSL.
The improvements over alternative ZSL models are
consistently significant under various settings.
2 RELATED WORK
In this section, we first briefly introduce some related works
of zero-shot learning, and then present a review for various
adversarial attacks.
Zero-shot Learning. According to whether information
about the testing data is involved during model learning,
existing ZSL models consist of inductive [9], [23], [24],
[25], [26] and transductive settings [27], [28], [29], [30],
[31]. Specifically, this transduction in ZSL can be embod-
ied in two progressive degrees: transductive for specific
unseen classes [32] and transductive for specific testing
samples [33]. Although transductive settings can rectify the
domain shift caused by the different distributions of the
training and the testing samples, it is problematic in many
practical scenarios. Thus, we take an inductive setting in this
work.
From the view of constructing the visual-semantic in-
teractions, existing inductive ZSL methods fall into four
categories. The first group learns a projection function from
the visual to the semantic space with a linear [17], [34],
[35] or a non-linear model [10], [20], [36], [37]. The testing
unseen data are then classified by matching the visual
representations in the class semantic embedding space with
the unseen class prototypes. The second group chooses the
reverse projection direction [24], [38], [39], to alleviate the
hubness problem caused by nearest neighbour search in
a high dimensional space [40]. The testing unseen data
are then classified by resorting to the most similar pseudo
visual examples in the visual space. The third group is a
combination of the first two groups by taking the encoder-
decoder paradigm but with the visual feature or class
prototype reconstruction constraint [24], [25]. It has been
verified that the projection function learned in this way is
able to generalize better to the unseen classes. The last group
learns an intermediate space, where both the visual and the
semantic spaces are projected to [32], [41], [42], [43].
However, they all ignore a fact that each class in ZSL
is only provided with one attribute vector, which is not
enough to represent all the samples in this class. Conse-
quently, the learned projection may not be effective enough
to recognize the samples from the same class. Besides, the
non-visual components are often included in the provided
semantic prototypes, such as “smart”, “agility”, and “inac-
tive” in benchmark dataset AWA2 [6]. Based only on visual
3TABLE 1
Key Notations
Notation Description
S,U Set of seen classes and set of unseen classes, respectively
X ,P Visual space and semantic space, respectively
Ntr Number of training samples
Ns, Nu Number of seen classes and number of unseen classes, respectively
(xtri , y
tr
i ) The ith labeled training sample: image x
tr
i ∈ X and label ytri ∈ S
xtei The ith unlabeled testing sample: image x
te
i ∈ X
(csi,p
s
i) The ith seen class c
s
i ∈ S and its class prototype psi ∈ P
(cui ,p
u
i ) The ith unseen class c
u
i ∈ U and its class prototype pui ∈ P
xtr
′
i , x
te′
i The ith training sample and testing sample both with an adversarial perturbation
ps
′
i ,p
u′
i The ith seen class prototype and unseen class prototype both with an adversarial perturbation
ρ Attack magnitude
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Fig. 2. The predictability of each binary attribute, measured with classi-
fication accuracy by fine-tuning the last layer of Resnet101 [44].
information, these attributes are almost impossible to be pre-
dicted and even with the level of random guess as observed
from Fig. 2. Thus, the learned projection cannot generalize
well on the unseen class domain, although work normally in
the seen class domain through supervised training. Consid-
ering such facts, we choose to learn an intermediate space
to perform zero-shot recognition. In particular, different
from existing models, our ATZSL connects the visual and
semantic embeddings in series instead of in parallel to avoid
amplifying the small perturbations.
Adversarial Attacks. Evaluating the robustness of a neu-
ral network can be done by crafting adversarial examples at
the testing time with a specific attack algorithm [45], [46],
[47], [48], [49], [50], [51]. It is worth noting that adversarial
attacks do not tamper with the targeted model but rather
force it to produce incorrect outputs. The effectiveness of
such attacks is determined mainly by the amount of infor-
mation available to the adversary about the model. There
is a large body of work on testing phase attacks, it can be
broadly classified into either White-Box or Black-Box attacks.
An adversary in white-box attack has total knowledge about
the model used for inference. The access to internal model
weights for a white-box attack, such as FGSM [47] and
Deepfool [50], usually corresponds to a very strong adver-
sarial attack since it works on the gradient of the network
loss function. Black-box attack (e.g., ZOO [46] and NES-
PGD [52]), on the contrary, assumes no knowledge about
the targeted model. It usually analyses the vulnerability of
the model by generating an implicit approximation to the
actual gradient, based on a greedy local search.
3 ADVERSARIALLY TRAINED ZERO-SHOT LEARN-
ING
In this section, we first set up the ZSL problem in the
presence of adversaries (Section 3.1), then develop an
ATZSL model to improve robustness of ZSL in the visual
space (Section 3.2), and finally derive an algorithm to solve
ATZSL (Section 3.3).
3.1 Problem Definition
Given labeled training samples Dtr = {(xtri , ytri )}Ntri=1 belong-
ing to the set of seen classes S , ATZSL aims to learn a robust
zero-shot classifier fu(·) : X → U that is effective especially
in the following two scenarios: i) ATZSL can classify not
only a clean testing sample xtei but also its adversarial
sample xte
′
i belonging to the set of unseen classes U ; ii)
ATZSL can classify a clean testing sample xtei even when
the unseen class prototypes are attacked. The key notations
used throughout this paper are summarized in Table 1.
3.2 ATZSL: Formulation
The key to ZSL is to transfer knowledge from the seen to the
unseen classes. Motivated by fact that class prototypes (e.g.,
attribute vectors) can bridge the two domains, we consider
transferring the prediction strategy of image-attribute rela-
tion. For this end, we design a relation prediction network
that consists of three modules: a feature extraction mod-
ule fφ, an attribute embedding module gϕ, and a relation
prediction module gψ , as illustrated in Fig. 3. The image
xtri and the attribute p
s
j are fed into the feature extraction
module fφ and the attribute embedding module gϕ, re-
spectively, which produce two embedding vectors fφ(xtri )
and gϕ(psj). Then, the concatenated embedding of fφ(x
tr
i )
and gϕ(psj) is fed into the relation prediction module gψ ,
which eventually produces a relation score rij measuring
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Fig. 3. The architecture of the proposed ATZSL to perform robust zero-shot recognition with a defensive relation prediction network. fφ, gϕ, and gψ
represent the feature extraction module, attribute embedding module, and relation prediction module, respectively.
the similarity between xtri and p
s
j . Thus, we generate Ns
scores for the relation between the sample xtri and each seen
class prototype by
rij = gψ
([
fTφ
(
xtri
)
, gTϕ
(
psj
)])
, j = 1, 2, · · · , Ns. (1)
It is worth noting that we choose concatenation oper-
ator, instead of the popularly used product operator (i.e.,
fTφ(x
tr
i )gϕ(p
s
j)) in previous works, to avoid amplifying the
small perturbations of input. Actually, the attribute embed-
ding gϕ(psj) serves as an additional feature map to enhance
the discriminability of input image with the original feature
map fφ(xtri ). More importantly, concatenation operator can
mitigate the domain shift caused by appearance variations
of each attribute across all classes.
Relation Based Cross Entropy Loss. In our ATZSL
framework, the probability of a sample xtri belonging to
the j-th seen class (i.e., csj) can be measured by the relation
between xtri and p
s
j , i.e.,
p
(
csj |xtri
)
=
exp (rij/γ)∑Ns
k=1 exp (rik/γ)
, (2)
where γ is the temperature to mitigate overfitting [53], and
γ = 1 is a common option. In particular, γ softens the
softmax (raises the output entropy) with γ > 1. As γ →∞,
p(csj |xtri ) → 1/Ns, which leads to maximum uncertainty.
As γ → 0, the probability collapses to a point mass (i.e.
p(csj |xtri ) = 1). Since γ does not change the maximum of the
softmax function, the class prediction remains unchanged if
γ 6= 1 is applied after convergence. Plugging the probability
in Eq. (2) into cross-entropy loss over the training sample xtri
from the seen classes S yields
L (φ, ϕ, ψ;xtri , ytri ,Ps) = Ns∑
j=1
qtrij log p
(
csj |xtri
)
, (3)
where Ps = {psi}Nsi=1. qtrij = 1 if ytri = csj and 0 otherwise.
ATZSL Formulation. To improve the robustness of our
ZSL model (corresponding to the first goal in Section 3.1),
we further inject adversarial examples into the training set
during model training [47], [48]. Specifically, when a clean
image xtri comes to the ZSL model, the attacker is allowed
to perturb the image into xtr
′
i with a bounded magnitude.
Then based on the loss function in Eq. (3), we define the
overall optimization formulation of the proposed ATZSL as
min
φ,ϕ,ψ
∑
(xtri ,y
tr
i )∈Dtr
{αL(φ, ϕ, ψ;xtri , ytri ,Ps)
+ (1− α) max
xtr
′
i ∈Bρ∞(xtri )
L(φ, ϕ, ψ;xtr′i , ytri ,Ps)},
(4)
where Bρ∞(x
tr
i ) := {xtr
′
i : ‖xtr
′
i − xtri ‖∞ ≤ ρ}, and ρ ≥ 0
denotes the predefined bound for the attack magnitude.
The second term in Eq. (4) aims to produce the adver-
sarial samples by maximally deteriorating the ZSL model
performance. α ∈ [0, 1] balances the effects of clean and
adversarial samples on the model training.
During the test phase, the predicted class ytei of sam-
ple xtei is given by y
te
i = arg maxcuj∈U p(c
u
j |xtei ) in the
standard ZSL case, and ytei = arg maxcj∈{S∪U} p(cj |xtei ) in
the generalized ZSL case. The latter is more practical for real
applications since prediction is made over both seen and
unseen classes [54].
3.3 ATZSL: Algorithm
It is not trivial to solve the optimization problem in
Eq. (4), since the last term in the objective function is a
maximization optimization problem. Considering the last
term as a new function, i.e., Ladv(φ, ϕ, ψ;xtri , ytri ,Ps) =
maxxtr′i ∈Bρ∞(xtri ) L(φ, ϕ, ψ;x
tr′
i , y
tr
i ,Ps), then we can solve
Eq. (4) as a standard minimization problem using
5Adam [55]. The main bottleneck is to determine the gradient
of Ladv(·). We refer to the following theorem [56]:
Theorem 1. (Danskin’s theorem) Let g(x,y) (x ∈ Rd,y ∈ Ω
is a compact set) be a differential function in terms of two vector
variables x,y. Assume for every y ∈ Ω, g(x,y) is convex in x.
Further assume G(x) = maxy∈Ω g(x,y) is also a differential
function in terms of x, and for any x, the optimal y∗(x) =
arg maxy∈Ω g(x,y) is unique in Ω. Then we have the following
result: dG(x)dx = ∇xg(x,y∗(x)).
Based on this theorem, instead of computing the gradi-
ent of Ladv(·) directly, we can first find the worst adversarial
image by xtr
′∗
i = arg maxxtr′i ∈Bρ∞(xtri ) L(φ, ϕ, ψ;x
tr′
i , y
tr
i ,Ps),
and then we have ∇φLadv(·) = ∇φL(xtr′∗i , ytri ,Ps;φ, ϕ, ψ)
(the same for ϕ and ψ). Thus, the last roadblock is how
to find xtr
′∗
i . Inspired by the generation method of ad-
versarial examples in IFGSM attack [48], we obtain xtr
′∗
i
using the sign stochastic gradient descent algorithm, where
the update formula for the i-th step of N iterations is:
xtr
′
i ← ProjBρ∞(xtri ){x
tr′
i + sign(∇xtriL(xtr
′
i , y
tr
i ,Ps;φ, ϕ, ψ))},
and  ← 1.25ρ/N . A recent study [57] has validated the
convergence of sign (stochastic) gradient descent algorithm.
Algorithm 1 shows the detailed steps of our ATZSL algo-
rithm against image attacks.
3.4 Extension
Besides providing improved robustness for ZSL in the vi-
sual space, ATZSL can be easily extended to deal with
the attacks in semantic space, corresponding to the second
goal in Section 3.1. Specifically, one unseen class prototype
provided in ZSL can be considered directly analogous to
one testing image, and thus can be attacked unavoidably
like testing images. To deal with such adversarial attribute
attacks effectively, we need to modify our framework in
Eq. (4) as follows:
min
φ,ϕ,ψ
∑
(xtri ,y
tr
i )∈Dtr
{αL(φ, ϕ, ψ;xtri , ytri ,Ps)
+ (1− α) max
ps
′
i ∈Bρ2 (psi),∀i
L(φ, ϕ, ψ;xtri , ytri ,Ps
′
)},
(5)
where Bρ2(p
s
i) := {ps
′
i : ‖ps
′
i − psi‖2 ≤ ρ}, and Ps
′
=
{ps′i }Nsi=1. The second term in Eq. (5) aims to produce the
adversarial class prototypes by maximally deteriorating the
ZSL model performance. It is worth noting that for attack
bound constraint, different from the `∞ attack in the visual
space, `2 attack is more reasonable in this scenario. This
is because ρ denotes the max change of a pixel for image
attacks, while the max total change of all attributes for at-
tribute attacks. The detailed algorithm for Eq. (5) is provided
in Algorithm 2.
4 EVALUATION SETUP AND METRICS
In this section, we first provide the evaluation protocols,
e.g. dataset splits and evaluation metrics, and then detail
our experimental implementation.
Algorithm 1: ATZSL for image attacks
Input: Dataset Dtr, prototypes Ps, stepsize sequence
{λt > 0}T−1t=0 , update steps N and T ,
temperature γ, and weight α.
Initialize φ, ϕ, ψ;
for t = 0 to T − 1 do
Sample (xtri , y
tr
i ) from Dtr;
Draw ρ ∈ [0, 4] from a truncated normal
distribution N (0, 2);
 = 1.25ρ/N ;
xtr
′
i ← xtri ;
for i = 0 to N − 1 do
∆ = sign(∇xtriL(xtr
′
i , y
tr
i ,Ps;φ, ϕ, ψ));
xtr
′
i ← ProjBρ∞(xtri ){x
tr′
i + ∆};
end
xtr
′∗
i ← xtr
′
i ;
Update φ, ϕ, ψ using Adam with λt;
end
Output: Model parameters φ, ϕ, ψ
Algorithm 2: ATZSL for attribute attacks
Input: Dataset Dtr, prototypes Ps, stepsize sequence
{λt > 0}T−1t=0 , update steps N and T ,
temperature γ, and weight α.
Initialize φ, ϕ, ψ;
for t = 0 to T − 1 do
Sample (xtri , y
tr
i ) from Dtr;
for i = 0 to N − 1 do
Sample ps from Ps;
Draw ρ ∈ [0, 54] from a truncated normal
distribution N(µ = 0, σ = 27);
←√ρ2/ |psi|;
Ps′ ← Ps;
∆ = sign(∇psiL(xtri , ytri ,Ps
′
;φ, ϕ, ψ));
ps
′ ← ProjBρ2 (psi){p
s′
i + ∆};
end
Ps′∗ ← Ps′ ;
Update φ, ϕ, ψ using Adam with λt;
end
Output: Model parameters φ, ϕ, ψ
4.1 Datasets and Protocols
Among the most widely used datasets for ZSL, we se-
lect one coarse-grained dataset (Animals with Attributes2
(AWA2)1 [6]), and one fine-grained dataset (CUB-200-2011
Birds (CUB)2 [58]). Specifically, AWA2 has 85 attributes,
containing 37,322 images from 50 different animal classes.
On average, each class includes 746 images where the least
populated class, i.e. mole, has 100 and the most populated
class, i.e. horse has 1645 examples. CUB has a large number
of classes and attributes, containing 11,788 images from 200
different types of birds annotated with 312 attributes.
We adopt the novel rigorous protocol3 proposed in [6],
1. http://cvml.ist.ac.at/AwA2/
2. http://www.vision.caltech.edu/visipedia/CUB-200-2011.html
3. http://www.mpi-inf.mpg.de/zsl-benchmark
6insuring that none of the unseen classes appear in ImageNet
1K, since ImageNet 1K is used to pre-train the Resnet model.
Otherwise the zero-shot rule would be violated. Specifically,
AWA2 and CUB datasets consist of 27 and 100 training
(seen) classes respectively while 10 and 50 test (unseen)
classes. The hyperparameter search is performed on a dis-
joint set of validation set of 13 and 50 classes respectively.
In particular, this protocol involves two settings: Standard
ZSL and Generalized ZSL. The latter emerges recently under
which the test set contains data samples from both seen and
unseen classes. This setting is thus clearly more reflective of
real-world application scenarios. By contrast, the test set in
standard ZSL only contains data samples from the unseen
classes.
4.2 Evaluation Metrics
At test phase of ZSL, we use the unified evaluation protocol
proposed in [6]. Specifically, under the standard ZSL setting,
we adopt the average per-class top-1 accuracy (T1) in the
following way:
accU =
1
Nu
∑
cui∈U
#correct predictions in cui
#samples in cui
.
Under the generalized ZSL setting, we compute the har-
monic mean (HM) of accS and accU to favor high accuracies
on both seen and unseen classes as follows:
H =
2 ∗ accS ∗ accU
accS + accU
,
where accS and accU are the average per-class top-1 accu-
racies of recognizing the testing samples from the seen and
the unseen classes, respectively, and
accS =
1
Ns
∑
csi∈S
#correct predictions in csi
#samples in csi
.
Finally, to evaluate the overall performance (i.e., trade-off on
clean and adversarial data) under the standard ZSL setting,
we further compute the harmonic mean (HT1) of T1cle and
T1adv, where T1cle and T1adv represent the T1 metric in the
clean and the adversarial scenarios, respectively. Similarly,
let HMcle and HMadv denote the HM metric in the clean
and adversarial scenarios, respectively. The harmonic mean
(HHM) of HMcle and HMadv is used to evaluate the overall
performance under the generalized ZSL setting.
4.3 Implementation Details
By tuning on the validation set, we set α = 0.5, γ = 1,
N = 3, and train ATZSL for 400 epochs on the two datasets
with weight decay 10−5. The learning rate λt is initialized to
10−5 with Adam and then annealed by 10% every 10 epochs.
Specifically, i) For the feature extraction module, before
being fed into the pre-trained Resnet34 network4, a color im-
age is first normalized with the means {0.485, 0.456, 0.406}
and standard deviations {0.229, 0.224, 0.225} with respect
to each channel. ii) For the attribute embedding module,
the continuous attributes5 between values 0 and 100 are fed
4. https://github.com/pytorch/vision/blob/master/torchvision/
models/resnet.py
5. Continuous attributes are also provided by datasets, as binary
attributes have been shown to be weaker than continuous attributes.
into the MLP network. The size of hidden layer (Fig. 3) is
set to 300 and 400 for AWA2 and CUB respectively, and
the output size is set to the same dimension (512) as the
image embedding for both datasets. Additionally, we add
weight decay (`2 regularisation), and ReLU non-linearity for
two fully-connected layers. iii) For the relation prediction
module, the image and prototype embeddings are concate-
nated before being fed into MLPs with hidden layer size
400 for both datasets. The first fully-connected layer is also
with ReLU. We add weight decay (`2 regularisation) in the
attribute embedding module as there is a hubness problem
in cross-modal mapping for ZSL which can be best solved
by mapping the semantic feature vector to the visual feature
space with regularisation.
Compared Methods. We choose to compare with sev-
eral competitive and representative ZSL methods that
have achieved the state-of-the-art results recently, including
DEM6 [39], FGN7 [11], MC-ZSL8 [12], and LDF9 [35]. Specif-
ically, DEM [39] and LDF [35] perform better in the second
and last group of ZSL methods (described in Section 2),
respectively. FGN [11] and MC-ZSL [12] are Generative
Adversarial Network (GAN) based ZSL models. In addition,
to validate the effectiveness of our proposed adversarial
training, we evaluate our ATZSL without adversarial sam-
ples, i.e., α = 1, dubbed Baseline.
During the test phase of each ZSL method, besides
using clean data (i.e., “No attack”), we evaluate the model
robustness using five widely used white-box attacks (includ-
ing FGSM [47], IFGSM [48], DeepFool [50], CW [45], and
WRM [51]), and one black-box attack (ZOO [46]). It is worth
noting that these attack methods have been standardized
in adversarial learning. IFGSM [48] is a straightforward
extension of FGSM [47] by applying it multiple times with
small step size. Compared with FGSM [47], DeepFool [50]
can generate adversarial perturbations with lower norm.
CW [45] introduces three new attacks for the `0, `2, and
`∞ distance metrics, and in our experiments, we adopt
`2 untargeted attacks. WRM [51] additionally considers a
Lagrangian penalty formulation of perturbation of the un-
derlying data distribution in a Wasserstein ball to achieve
worst-case perturbations of training data. ZOO [46] is a ze-
roth order optimization based attack to directly estimate the
gradients of the targeted model for generating adversarial
examples, and we also adopt the widely used `2 untargeted
attacks to our model.
Attack Settings. i) During model training of ATZSL,
we employ the IFGSM attacker [48] to find adversarial
examples. Specifically, for attacks in the visual space, the
attack magnitude ρ in each epoch is drawn from a truncated
normal distribution defined in interval [0, 4] with N (0, 2)
for both datasets. Due to different dimensions of attributes,
for attacks in the semantic space, ρ ∈ [0, 27] with underlying
normal distributionN (0, 14) for AWA2, and ρ ∈ [0, 54] with
underlying normal distributionN (0, 27) for CUB. ii) During
the test phase, we adopt five widely used white-box attacks
(including FGSM [47], IFGSM [48], DeepFool [50], CW [45],
6. https://github.com/lzrobots/DeepEmbeddingModel ZSL
7. http://datasets.d2.mpi-inf.mpg.de/xian/cvpr18xian.zip
8. https://github.com/rfelixmg/frwgan-eccv18
9. https://github.com/shaoniangu/Zero shot learning using
LDF tensorflow
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Fig. 4. Comparison (T1:%) of several ZSL methods on two datasets under the standard ZSL setting in various attack scenarios. For horizontal axis,
’N’, ’F’, ’I’, ’D’, ’C’, ’W’, and ’Z’ represent No attack, FGSM, IFGSM, DeepFool, CW, WRM, and ZOO attack methods, respectively. The numbers with
respect to ’F’, ’I’, and ’W’ represent the attack magnitudes.
TABLE 2
Comparative Results (HT1:%) of Several ZSL Methods on AWA2 under the Standard ZSL Setting with Various Attacks in the Visual Space. ’-’
Represents that the Attack Magnitude Is Not Required for That Attack Method. The Number in Parentheses Measures the Improvement Obtained
by Our ATZSL over the Strongest Competitor in Terms of HT1
Attack type Magnitude DEM [39] FGN [11] MC-ZSL [12] LDF [35] Baseline ATZSL(Ours)
FGSM [47]
ρ = 1 35.2 39.8 38.6 39.7 42.3 50.7(8.4)
ρ = 2 30.5 32.8 29.5 28.9 34.5 47.2(12.7)
ρ = 4 25.7 21.8 24.4 20.4 23.2 41.3(15.6)
IFGSM [48]
ρ = 1 32.3 38.1 35.7 35.0 35.6 51.5(13.4)
ρ = 2 23.6 30.4 30.9 28.7 27.7 48.3(17.4)
ρ = 4 17.1 19.1 20.9 17.6 19.2 40.6(19.7)
DeepFool [50] - 30.8 34.3 27.9 30.2 38.4 51.2(12.8)
CW [45] - 34.1 32.0 29.3 28.9 34.0 47.5(13.4)
WRM [51]
ρ = 1 33.1 30.3 35.2 39.9 38.2 49.6(9.7)
ρ = 2 24.7 23.5 27.2 31.1 34.6 42.1(7.5)
ρ = 4 17.1 19.1 20.2 27.4 25.4 39.9(12.5)
ZOO [46] - 30.9 30.3 31.1 26.0 33.7 45.6(11.9)
and WRM [51]), and one black-box attack (ZOO [46]). Specif-
ically, for FGSM [47], IFGSM [48], and WRM [51] attacks,
we fix the image perturbation magnitude as ρ ∈ {1, 2, 4}
for both datasets in the visual space. Specially, ρ has the
same range for any datasets since each pixel is in [0, 255].
Generally, ρ ≤ 8 for imperceptibility. While in the seman-
tic space, we fix the attribute perturbation magnitude as
ρ ∈ {9, 18, 27} and ρ ∈ {18, 36, 54} for AWA2 and CUB
respectively. That is, the attribute attack magnitude on CUB
is larger than that on AWA2, since CUB has 312 attributes
while AWA2 has only 85. Additionally, we set the number of
attack iterations as 9 for IFGSM [48], DeepFool [50], CW [45],
and WRM [51] attacks.
5 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
We first present standard ZSL results on AWA2 and CUB
datasets with various attacks in visual and semantic spaces.
Then, we provide results for the generalized ZSL setting.
Additionally, several ablation experiments are further con-
ducted to demonstrate the effectiveness of our ATZSL. Fi-
nally, we also provide complexity analysis of our method to
show its efficiency.
5.1 Standard ZSL
To evaluate the effectiveness of our proposed ATZSL un-
der the standard ZSL setting, we first perform recogni-
tion task on AWA2 and CUB datasets without any at-
tacks, and then with six typical attack methods, including
FGSM [47], IFGSM [48], DeepFool [50], CW [45], WRM [51],
and ZOO [46].
Standard ZSL Results on AWA2. We first evaluate the
robustness and transferability of ATZSL in Eq. (4), where the
adversarial images are generated to train our ZSL model.
Fig. 4(a) shows the compared results on AWA2 dataset in
terms of average per-class top-1 accuracy (T1) with other
five ZSL methods, i.e., DEM [39], FGN [11], MC-ZSL [12],
LDF [35], and our Baseline. Specifically, the performance
of standard ZSL without any attacks (i.e., T1cle) for each
method is denoted by ‘N’ in horizontal axis. And the re-
mainder in horizontal axis denote the performances with
six types of attacks (i.e., T1adv) in the visual space, where we
also set three kinds of attack magnitudes (i.e., ρ ∈ {1, 2, 4})
for FGSM [47], IFGSM [48], and WRM [51] attacks. To illus-
trate the trade-off of each method on clean and adversarial
samples more straightforwardly, we further provide the har-
monic mean (HT1) of T1cle and T1adv in Table 2. By contrast,
it can be observed that our ATZSL obtains remarkably more
favorable trade-off of zero-shot recognition performances on
clean and adversarial images of AWA2, over currently avail-
able alternatives. The improvements achieved by our model
over the strongest competitor range from 7.5% to 19.7%.
Additionally, Fig. 4(a) shows that image attacks deteriorate
the performance of each compared ZSL method under no
attack scenario (i.e., T1cle). However, our ATZSL shows
the most non-obvious degradation in various image attack
scenarios. Therefore, ATZSL paves a possible direction to
improve robustness of ZSL.
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Comparative Results (HT1:%) of Several ZSL Methods on AWA2 under the Standard ZSL with Various Attacks in the Semantic Space. The
Number in Parentheses Measures the Improvement Obtained by Our ATZSL over the Strongest Competitor in Terms of HT1
Attack type Magnitude DEM [39] FGN [11] MC-ZSL [12] LDF [35] Baseline ATZSL(Ours)
FGSM [47]
ρ = 9 30.0 32.6 29.3 29.4 33.9 46.8(12.9)
ρ = 18 24.7 25.6 21.9 22.2 26.2 41.4(15.2)
ρ = 27 22.3 22.8 17.2 15.7 21.7 38.6(15.8)
IFGSM [48]
ρ = 9 27.3 29.7 27.5 28.6 30.2 42.0(11.8)
ρ = 18 19.0 21.3 20.2 23.1 20.1 35.7(12.6)
ρ = 27 17.1 17.5 16.5 20.2 17.4 31.8(11.6)
WRM [51]
ρ = 9 28.9 30.7 33.8 30.6 31.3 49.6(15.8)
ρ = 18 20.9 25.7 24.8 23.6 24.8 41.6(15.9)
ρ = 27 17.9 21.9 18.4 17.1 21.7 38.6(16.7)
TABLE 4
Comparative Results (HT1:%) of Several ZSL Methods on CUB under the Standard ZSL with Various Attacks in the Visual Space. ’-’ Represents
that the Attack Magnitude Is Not Required for That Attack Method. The Number in Parentheses Measures the Improvement Obtained by Our
ATZSL over the Strongest Competitor in Terms of HT1
Attack type Magnitude DEM [39] FGN [11] MC-ZSL [12] LDF [35] Baseline ATZSL(Ours)
FGSM [47]
ρ = 1 26.3 28.3 27.8 25.0 29.4 50.9(21.5)
ρ = 2 23.1 21.5 21.8 18.8 24.9 48.7(23.8)
ρ = 4 17.7 16.2 17.4 15.4 19.9 46.1(26.2)
IFGSM [48]
ρ = 1 21.9 24.8 19.9 23.7 23.5 49.2(24.4)
ρ = 2 15.8 20.3 19.4 17.1 17.5 43.5(23.2)
ρ = 4 12.9 16.7 15.5 14.4 14.7 37.7(21.0)
DeepFool [50] - 19.2 14.5 19.1 12.8 21.8 45.2(23.4)
CW [45] - 19.6 16.2 17.2 16.8 21.3 40.2 (18.9)
WRM [51]
ρ = 1 25.9 25.9 21.3 27.8 29.3 50.6(21.3)
ρ = 2 19.3 18.2 21.0 17.7 21.9 43.4 (21.5)
ρ = 4 15.8 16.6 16.2 15.3 20.7 40.3(19.6)
ZOO [46] - 17.0 16.2 22.5 20.9 17.2 41.8(19.3)
Then, we evaluate the robustness and transferability of
ATZSL in Eq. (5), where the adversarial attributes of seen
classes are generated to train our ZSL model. Fig. 4(b)
shows the compared results on AWA2 in terms of average
per-class top-1 accuracy (T1) with five ZSL methods. ‘N’
in horizontal axis still denotes the performance without
any attacks (i.e., T1cle) for each method, and the remainder
represent T1adv under three types of attacks, i.e., FGSM [47],
IFGSM [48], and WRM [51] with ρ ∈ {9, 18, 27}. Cor-
respondingly, Table 3 presents the harmonic mean (HT1),
i.e., the trade-off of each method on clean and adversarial
attributes. As expected, our ATZSL can also obtain more
promising trade-off of zero-shot recognition performances
on clean and adversarial attributes of AWA2 over all com-
petitors, generally more than 11.6%. Meanwhile, as shown
in Fig. 4(b), our ATZSL can achieve the consistently slightest
performance degradation in various attribute attack scenar-
ios compared with no attack case.
Standard ZSL Results on CUB. Likewise, under the
standard ZSL setting, we further evaluate the performances
of ATZSL in Eq. (4) and Eq. (5) on CUB dataset. First,
we train our ATZSL by Eq. (4), and test on both clean
and adversarial images of CUB. The compared results in
terms of average per-class top-1 accuracy (T1) with five
representative ZSL methods are plotted in Fig. 4(c), where
‘N’ in horizontal axis denotes the performance without any
attacks (i.e. T1cle), and the remainder represent T1adv under
six types of attacks with three types of magnitudes. Table 4
additionally presents the harmonic mean (HT1) of T1cle and
T1adv, to show the trade-off of each method on clean and
adversarial images. We can find that the improvements
obtained by our ATZSL over the strongest competitor are
averagely around 21.5%. Then, we train our ATZSL by
Eq. (5), and test on both clean and adversarial attributes
of CUB. Fig. 4(d) shows the average per-class top-1 accuracy
(T1) of each method under various attack settings, including
no attack case (T1cle) and three kinds of attacks with three
types of magnitudes (T1adv). The trade-off of each method
on clean and adversarial attributes is quantitatively com-
pared in Table 5 with harmonic mean (HT1) of T1cle and
T1adv. In this scenario, our method still can improve the
trade-off performance over the strongest competitor by an
obvious margin (14.6%∼26.8%). From these results on CUB,
we can draw similar conclusions with AWA2. Specially,
the improvements obtained by our ATZSL on CUB are
more significant than those on AWA2, for both image and
attribute attacks. This is possibly due to the fact that the
samples in CUB are fine-grained, and thus we can generate
more reliable adversarial samples to train a more robust ZSL
model.
In summary, the four tables demonstrate that our ATZSL
can achieve obviously more competitive trade-off of stan-
dard zero-shot recognition performances on clean and ad-
versarial data. More importantly, such obvious improve-
ments have not sacrificed the T1 performance of our ATZSL
in the no attack scenario, as shown in the four figures.
5.2 Generalized ZSL
Compared with standard ZSL, it is much more technically
difficult to perform generalized ZSL since prediction needs
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Comparative Results (HT1:%) of Several ZSL Methods on CUB under the Standard ZSL with Various Attacks in the Semantic Space. The
Number in Parentheses Measures the Improvement Obtained by Our ATZSL over the Strongest Competitor in Terms of HT1
Attack type Magnitude DEM [39] FGN [11] MC-ZSL [12] LDF [35] Baseline ATZSL(Ours)
FGSM [47]
ρ = 18 19.9 22.9 19.8 22.1 26.3 42.2(15.9)
ρ = 36 13.7 6.4 7.8 9.0 11.1 31.2 (17.5)
ρ = 54 0.6 2.5 2.7 5.3 5.5 24.5(19.0)
IFGSM [48]
ρ = 18 16.9 18.9 16.1 16.9 21.7 40.2 (18.5)
ρ = 36 4.4 9.9 5.2 2.5 7.3 25.9 (16.0)
ρ = 54 1.2 2.0 0.8 2.2 3.7 18.3(14.6)
WRM [51]
ρ = 18 18.9 14.5 15.0 17.5 17.7 40.5(21.6)
ρ = 36 5.3 3.5 10.7 11.2 7.3 38.0(26.8)
ρ = 54 2.2 0.6 1.4 2.2 3.9 27.8(23.9)
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Fig. 5. Comparison (HM:%) of several ZSL methods on two datasets under the generalized ZSL setting in various attack scenarios. For horizontal
axis, ’N’, ’F’, ’I’, ’D’, ’C’, ’W’, and ’Z’ represent No attack, FGSM, IFGSM, DeepFool, CW, WRM, and ZOO attack methods, respectively. The numbers
with respect to ’F’, ’I’, and ’W’ represent the attack magnitudes.
TABLE 6
Comparative Results (HHM:%) of Several ZSL Methods on AWA2 under the Generalized ZSL with Various Attacks in the Visual Space. ’-’
Represents that the Attack Magnitude Is Not Required for That Attack Method. The Number in Parentheses Measures the Improvement Obtained
by Our ATZSL over the Strongest Competitor in Terms of HHM
Attack type Magnitude DEM [39] FGN [11] MC-ZSL [12] LDF [35] Baseline ATZSL(Ours)
FGSM [47]
ρ = 1 4.4 5.9 6.4 6.4 6.3 27.9(21.5)
ρ = 2 3.5 2.7 4.2 5.7 4.1 23.5(17.8)
ρ = 4 0.8 0.8 2.0 0.6 0.6 15.0(13.0)
IFGSM [48]
ρ = 1 2.5 5.3 2.4 4.0 2.5 25.8(20.5)
ρ = 2 0.4 2.5 0.8 2.7 4.3 19.7(15.4)
ρ = 4 0.4 0.2 0.6 0.2 2.4 13.9(11.5)
DeepFool [50] - 2.5 4.6 4.2 2.5 6.8 25.1(18.3)
CW [45] - 6.7 2.5 6.4 5.3 7.7 23.7 (16.0)
WRM [51]
ρ = 1 5.8 6.1 2.5 3.9 4.4 25.2 (19.1)
ρ = 2 2.1 2.5 0.2 2.3 2.0 20.9(18.4)
ρ = 4 0.6 0.6 0.2 0.4 0.2 15.1(14.5)
ZOO [46] - 4.9 4.4 0.6 8.3 7.3 25.2(16.9)
to be made over both seen and unseen classes. Even so,
we still perform generalized ZSL tasks using several ZSL
methods on both AWA2 and CUB datasets, under various
attack settings. In particular, we can directly use the ATZSL
model trained for standard ZSL tasks in Section 5.1 for
generalized ZSL during the test phase.
Generalized ZSL Results on AWA2. Under the gener-
alized ZSL setting, we first evaluate the performances of
ATZSL in Eq. (4) and Eq. (5) on AWA2 dataset, correspond-
ing to the image and attribute attacks respectively. It is
worth noting that the two models are trained as those in
standard ZSL on AWA2. During the test phase, we need
to search in both the seen and the unseen class spaces,
where the attack implementation is the same as that in
Section 5.1. After attacking images in AWA2 with six types
of attack methods and three types of magnitudes, we show
the compared results in terms of harmonic mean (HM) with
five ZSL methods in Fig. 5(a). Concretely, ‘N’ in horizontal
axis still denotes the performance without any attacks (i.e.,
HMcle), and others represent HMadv. Obviously, unlike those
ZSL baselines that are very sensitive to image attacks, our
ATZSL achieves the slightest degradation in various image
attack scenarios. Meanwhile, Table 6 reports the harmonic
mean (HHM) of HMcle and HMadv under each attack method,
i.e., the trade-off of each method on clean and adversarial
images. It can be seen that our ATZSL can also perform
best on the generalized ZSL task even with various image
attacks. The improvements over the strongest competitor
range from 11.5% to 21.5%. Moreover, by attacking at-
tributes in AWA2 with three kinds of attack methods and
three types of magnitudes, Fig. 5(b) plots the compared
results in terms of harmonic mean (HM), including HMcle
10
TABLE 7
Comparative Results (HHM:%) of Several ZSL Methods on AWA2 under the Generalized ZSL with Various Attacks in the Semantic Space. The
Number in Parentheses Measures the Improvement Obtained by Our ATZSL over the Strongest Competitor in Terms of HHM
Attack type Magnitude DEM [39] FGN [11] MC-ZSL [12] LDF [35] Baseline ATZSL(Ours)
FGSM [47]
ρ = 9 6.3 12.2 7.8 9.0 8.0 38.5(26.3)
ρ = 18 1.2 4.2 4.4 3.5 4.1 35.1(30.7)
ρ = 27 0.4 2.2 0.6 0.4 0.8 29.4(27.2)
IFGSM [48]
ρ = 9 5.8 3.5 7.3 9.0 5.5 36.5(27.5)
ρ = 18 2.0 0.4 3.5 3.7 2.0 32.7(29.0)
ρ = 27 1.0 0.4 0.6 2.3 0.8 23.6(21.3)
WRM [51]
ρ = 9 10.4 7.0 6.4 8.0 6.6 36.1(25.7)
ρ = 18 4.9 2.0 4.1 2.2 3.5 30.1(25.2)
ρ = 27 2.5 0.8 0.6 0.6 1.4 23.8(21.3)
TABLE 8
Comparative Results (HHM:%) of Several ZSL Methods on CUB under the Generalized ZSL with Various Attacks in the Visual Space. ’-’
Represents that the Attack Magnitude Is Not Required for That Attack Method. The Number in Parentheses Measures the Improvement Obtained
by Our ATZSL over the Strongest Competitor in Terms of HHM
Attack type Magnitude DEM [39] FGN [11] MC-ZSL [12] LDF [35] Baseline ATZSL(Ours)
FGSM [47]
ρ = 1 3.6 10.9 11.1 8.6 9.3 35.8(24.7)
ρ = 2 2.4 3.7 2.3 3.7 4.4 28.2(23.8)
ρ = 4 0.6 2.0 2.2 0.8 1.8 21.2(19.0)
IFGSM [48]
ρ = 1 3.2 3.8 9.5 9.4 7.9 33.5(24.0)
ρ = 2 1.7 0.6 4.2 2.7 4.4 24.0(19.6)
ρ = 4 1.0 0.6 3.5 1.8 1.6 15.3(11.8)
DeepFool [50] - 3.6 7.9 5.0 4.2 10.6 29.8 (19.2)
CW [45] - 5.0 4.8 5.7 4.4 6.7 28.2(21.5)
WRM [51]
ρ = 1 4.8 5.8 4.6 8.3 5.9 34.2 (25.9)
ρ = 2 0.2 0.6 2.0 5.5 0.6 28.7 (23.2)
ρ = 4 0.2 0.8 1.8 0.6 0.8 16.5(14.7)
ZOO [46] - 5.9 7.7 6.7 5.5 7.6 30.5 (22.8)
TABLE 9
Comparative Results (HHM:%) of Several ZSL Methods on CUB under the Generalized ZSL with Various Attacks in the Semantic Space. The
Number in Parentheses Measures the Improvement Obtained by Our ATZSL over the Strongest Competitor in Terms of HHM
Attack type Magnitude DEM [39] FGN [11] MC-ZSL [12] LDF [35] Baseline ATZSL(Ours)
FGSM [47]
ρ = 18 3.6 13.9 16.7 14.1 17.0 37.9(20.9)
ρ = 36 0.6 7.1 8.3 4.6 7.8 33.4(25.1)
ρ = 54 0.2 4.4 3.5 0.6 5.3 28.8(23.5)
IFGSM [48]
ρ = 18 3.6 14.4 12.8 17.1 14.9 34.5(17.4)
ρ = 36 0.8 6.0 7.8 5.8 6.6 27.4 (19.6)
ρ = 54 0.8 3.5 1.8 2.9 5.7 18.9(13.2)
WRM [51]
ρ = 18 2.0 17.1 10.5 12.8 15.5 37.5 (20.4)
ρ = 36 1.5 8.8 2.3 3.5 6.2 31.5(22.7)
ρ = 54 0.6 1.0 0.6 2.0 4.2 28.2 (24.0)
and HMadv for each attack method. Their harmonic means
(HHM) are computed in Table 7. It is as expected that our
ATZSL has more promising trade-off performance on clean
and adversarial attributes (generally more than 21.3%), and
meanwhile, only loses a negligible performance on clean
attributes as shown in ‘N’ of the horizontal axis of Fig. 5(b).
Generalized ZSL Results on CUB. Likewise, we further
evaluate the generalized ZSL performances of ATZSL in
Eq. (4) and Eq. (5) on CUB dataset. By attacking images
with various methods, we plot the compared results in
terms of harmonic mean (HM) in Fig. 5(c), including HMcle
and HMadv for each attack method. Their harmonic means
(HHM) are computed in Table 8. Then, by attacking attributes
with several methods, we plot the compared results in
terms of harmonic mean (HM) in Fig. 5(d), including HMcle
and HMadv for each attack method. Their harmonic means
(HHM) are presented in Table 9. By contrast, we can make
consistent conclusions with generalized ZSL on AWA2. That
is, the robustness and transferability abilities can indeed
be jointly optimized better by our ATZSL. Specifically, as
reported in Table 8 and Table 9, even though the unseen im-
ages and attributes are attacked, and may be consequently
similar with those seen class images and attributes, respec-
tively. ATZSL still can improve the overall performance
(i.e., harmonic mean HHM) over the strongest alternative by
an obvious margin (11.8% ∼ 25.9% for image attacks, and
13.2% ∼ 25.1% for attribute attacks, respectively).
Besides the similar conclusion to standard ZSL, we have
an additional observation for generalized ZSL. As shown
in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5, the performances in terms of HM in
generalized ZSL are much weaker than T1 in standard ZSL.
This is not surprising since the seen classes are included in
the search space which act as distractors for the samples that
come from unseen classes.
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(a) ρ = 1
(b) ρ = 2
(c) ρ = 4
(d) ρ = 8
(e) ρ = 16
Fig. 6. The test unseen images on CUB dataset attacked by various attack methods with five types of attack magnitudes (ρ).
Original attribute FGSM attack IFGSM attack WRM attack
(a) ρ = 18
Original attribute FGSM attack IFGSM attack WRM attack
(b) ρ = 36
Original attribute FGSM attack IFGSM attack WRM attack
(c) ρ = 54
Fig. 7. The t-SNE of all class attributes on CUB dataset attacked by various attack methods during the test phase with three types of attack
magnitudes (ρ). For each figure, the dark color represents the seen class attributes without any attacks, and the light color represents the unseen
class attributes with no attacks, and three types of attacks respectively.
To straightforwardly illustrate the attack effect on im-
ages, we show one image in CUB dataset attacked by six
kinds of methods during the test phase in Fig. 6 corre-
sponding to five attack magnitudes. It can be observed that
the magnitude required attack methods (i.e., FGSM [47],
IFGSM [48], and WRM [51]) are generally perceptible when
ρ > 4. In addition, by comparing original image with
various attacked images, we can find that the gradient
based attack methods, including FGSM [47], IFGSM [48],
and WRM [51], are very strong, thus being challenging to
defense. Furthermore, we also illustrate the attribute dis-
tribution before and after being attacked using t-SNE [59].
As shown in Fig. 7 for CUB dataset with three types
of attack magnitudes, a small adversarial perturbation is
able to change the relationship between the seen and the
unseen class attributes. This will definitely deteriorate the
zero-shot recognition performance by transferring wrong
information, if it is not been defensed. More visualized
results are provided in the supplementary material. The
same conclusion can be summarized from AWA2 dataset.
Therefore, the research on robustness of zero-shot learning
is very necessary and valuable.
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Fig. 8. Comparison (T1:%) of several ZSL methods with their adapted versions on two datasets under the standard ZSL setting in various attack
scenarios. For horizontal axis, ’N’, ’F’, ’I’, ’D’, ’C’, ’W’, and ’Z’ represent No attack, FGSM, IFGSM, DeepFool, CW, WRM, and ZOO attack methods,
respectively. The numbers with respect to ’F’, ’I’, and ’W’ represent the attack magnitudes.
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Fig. 9. Comparison (HM:%) of several ZSL methods with their adapted versions on two datasets under the generalized ZSL setting in various
attack scenarios. For horizontal axis, ’N’, ’F’, ’I’, ’D’, ’C’, ’W’, and ’Z’ represent No attack, FGSM, IFGSM, DeepFool, CW, WRM, and ZOO attack
methods, respectively. The numbers with respect to ’F’, ’I’, and ’W’ represent the attack magnitudes.
5.3 Ablation Study
Actually, we have conducted a vital ablation study,
namely Baseline in Section 5.1 and Section 5.2. By com-
parison, ATZSL consistently outperforms Baseline on AWA2
and CUB datasets under both standard and generalized ZSL
settings for image or attribute attacks. This just verifies that
training ZSL models with adversarial samples or attributes
is indeed effective. To further verify this fact, we addition-
ally train the state-of-the-art ZSL methods (DEM [39] and
LDF [35]) with adversarial examples, named DEM-adv and
LDF-adv. It is worth noting that GAN based ZSL methods
(e.g., FGN [11] and MC-ZSL [12]) have not been considered
since they are very complex and also cannot been adapted
for image attacks. The key to adaption is to generate adver-
sarial images or attributes by maximizing original objective
function as that in Eq. (4) or Eq. (5). Particularly, we need to
adapt DEM [39] as an end-to-end model by training it with
the feature extraction module (Resnet34) simultaneously.
Fig. 8 shows the T1 performances of adapted competitors
under the standard ZSL setting. It can be seen that for
both datasets, there exists an obvious gap between DEM-
adv and DEM [39] (resp. LDF-adv and LDF [35]) in terms
of T1 in each attack scenario. Likewise, under the gener-
alized ZSL setting, we also present the performances (i.e.,
HM) of adapted competitors on two datasets under various
attack scenarios in Fig. 9. Consequently, the similarly large
gap between DEM-adv and DEM [39] (resp. LDF-adv and
LDF [35]) re-verifies that using adversarial data can indeed
improve the robustness of ZSL models. More importantly, as
shown in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5, under no attack scenario (denoted
by ‘N’ in horizontal axis), our Baseline has achieved higher
performance than competitors (e.g., DEM [39], LDF [35],
FGN [11], and MC-ZSL [12]). Thus adversarially training
on our baseline instead of others is more promising. This
can be verified by an observation in Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 that
our ATZSL consistently outperforms the two adapted ZSL
methods (DEM-adv and LDF-adv).
Besides, we further conduct two additional ablation
studies: i) We train our ATZSL without clean samples or
attributes (i.e., α = 0), named Baseline2, to verify the neces-
sity of retaining clean data. ii) We replace the concatenation
operator in Eq. (1) with product operator for feature maps,
named Baseline3, to verify the advantage of concatenation
as claimed in Section 3.2. In particular, we set α = 1 in
Baseline3 for convenient implementation. The related re-
sults are presented in Fig. 8 and Fig. 9, corresponding to the
standard and the generalized ZSL settings respectively10. It
is as expected that our ATZSL performs consistently best
compared with our various baselines under any attacks.
Specifically, an obvious gap between the performances of
ATZSL and Baseline2 demonstrates the first ablation study,
while the gap between Baseline and Baseline3 manifests the
second one. In essence, clean and adversarial samples play
an equally important role for training a robust ZSL model.
5.4 Complexity Analysis
To demonstrate the efficiency of our ATZSL in Eq. (4) and
Eq. (5) for image and attribute attacks, respectively, we fur-
ther provide the computational costs during model training
10. The trade-off of each method is presented in the supplementary
material.
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TABLE 10
Training Time (sec.) of Each Part During An Iteration, Where the Numbers in Bold Are the Added Overhead Using Our ATZSL
Forward (Clean) Finding adversarial data Forward (Adversarial) Backward Total
AWA2 Image attack 22 226 22 103 378Attribute attack 2 17 2 9 31
CUB Image attack 7 70 7 34 119Attribute attack 2 12 2 6 23
under the standard ZSL setting (the same as the generalized
ZSL setting). Specifically, given the network parameters φ,
ϕ, and φ, the forward complexity of our model isO((2+q)d)
to compute each pair-wise relationship score between every
training example and each seen class prototype. q and d
denote the dimensions of class prototype and image embed-
ding, respectively. Thus, it is actually efficient to obtain all
clean scores with the complexity of Of = O(NtrNs(2+ q)d).
Supposing Ob denotes the backward complexity of our
network on all clean data, finding the worst adversarial
data only relies on the gradient with respect to input but
not all the variables, and thus costs must far less than
N(Of +Ob). In particular, N is the update steps in IFGSM
during training, and generally small (we set N = 9 in
our experiments). Consequently, with an additional forward
cost on the generated adversarial data, the overall cost of our
algorithm is far less than (N + 2)Of + (N + 1)Ob. This is
practically acceptable though more than original Of + Ob.
In particular, the complexity of our baseline, i.e., Of +Ob, is
really low in ZSL compared with those methods taking far
more complicated nonlinear formulation.
To present the overhead of ATZSL more intuitively, we
further provide the running time of each part in our algo-
rithm. Concretely, with 2661 MiB and 739 MiB GPU memory
usage for image and attribute attacks on AWA2 dataset
respectively (2717 MiB and 1207 MiB on CUB dataset), Ta-
ble 10 reports the physical training time during an iteration
of our ATZSL. The max numbers of iteration are 300 and
2000 for image and attribute attacks, respectively. It can
be concluded that the added overhead, including finding
and training the worst adversarial data, can be neglected in
practice to the significant accuracy improvements achieved
by these adversarial data. In addition, our ATZSL, though
adds some overhead, still takes comparable or even less
time than GAN based ZSL methods (e.g., FGN [11] and MC-
ZSL [12]).
6 CONCLUSION
In this work, we addressed the new problem of simulta-
neously achieving high robustness and transferability in
zero-shot learning. For this end, we developed ATZSL: an
adversarially trained zero-shot model by integrating the two
goals in one unified constrained optimization framework.
Specifically, a defensive relation prediction network was
designed to transfer knowledge from the seen to the unseen
class domains. Meanwhile, during the training phase, we
injected adversarial images or attributes into our network
to transfer knowledge from the clean to the adversarial
domains, thus learning a robust ZSL model. Extensive ex-
periments have been carried out to endorse the effective-
ness and efficiency of ATZSL by observing the following:
i) compared with state-of-the-art ZSL models and their
variants, our ATZSL performs consistently better on various
adversarial data for zero-shot recognition task, while only
loses a negligible performance on clean data; ii) under the
standard or generalized ZSL setting, ATZSL can consistently
remain robust against different attackers both in the visual
and semantic spaces.
We emphasize the first attempt to study robustness of
ZSL creatively, which is really practically important. More-
over, ATZSL could serve as a benchmark for later scholars,
though defense with adversarial data is general. Based on
ATZSL, we are recently trying to narrow the large accu-
racy gap between clean and adversarial samples on unseen
classes of ZSL, with multi-level distribution alignment con-
straint. This is a valuable issue since it is still challenging
even on general classification tasks.
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